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DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS FOR INTRACTABLE MEDICAL FUTILITY DISPUTES
I. INTRODUCTION
 In January 2008, seventy-three-year-old Ruben Betancourt was admitted to 
Trinitas Hospital, in Elizabeth, New Jersey, for surgery on a thymus gland tumor.1 
While the surgery was successful, during his post-operative recovery, Mr. Betancourt’s 
endotracheal tube became dislodged. This resulted in severe, irreversible brain 
damage. Mr. Betancourt was subsequently discharged to other health care facilities.2 
 In July 2008, Mr. Betancourt was readmitted to Trinitas with a diagnosis of 
renal failure. He remained there for the next year, in a persistent vegetative state, 
dependent for survival on mechanical ventilation, hemodialysis, and tube feedings. 
During this time, Mr. Betancourt developed increasingly severe decubitus ulcers and 
recurrent infections. He remained a full code, meaning that clinicians would attempt 
to resuscitate him if either his heart or breathing stopped.3
 In light of his deteriorating status, Mr. Betancourt’s physicians determined that 
he was beyond medical rescue.4 They judged that it was medically inappropriate and 
outside the standard of care to continue Mr. Betancourt’s life-sustaining treatment.5 
Indeed, they determined that it would be ethically inappropriate—and even 
inhumane—to artificially sustain Mr. Betancourt.6 He had no prospect of recovery.7 
He could not communicate or otherwise interact with his environment.8 Additionally, 
his body was decomposing.9
 Accordingly, Mr. Betancourt’s treatment team wanted to discontinue dialysis and 
issue a do-not-attempt-resuscitation (DNAR) order.10 Since Mr. Betancourt lacked 
decisionmaking capacity, the team carefully explained their proposed treatment plan to 
Mr. Betancourt’s surrogate, his daughter.11 But, even after many conferences, she would 
not consent.12 She instead demanded that Trinitas continue her father’s dialysis.13
1. See Betancourt v. Trinitas Hosp., 1 A.3d 823, 825 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010); see also Thaddeus 
M. Pope, Responding to Requests for Non-Beneficial Treatment, MD Advisor, Winter 2012, at 12, 13 
[hereinafter Pope, Non-Beneficial Treatment].
2. See Betancourt, 1 A.3d at 825.
3. See id. at 826.
4. See Betancourt v. Trinitas Hosp., No. C-12-09, slip op. at 4 (N.J. Super Ct. Ch. Div. Mar. 4, 2009), 
available at http://www.thaddeuspope.com/images/Betancourt_v_trinitas_3-4_2.pdf. 
5. See id. 
6. See id. 
7. See id. at 6. 
8. See id. at 2.
9. See id. at 4. 
10. See id. at 2.
11. See Betancourt v. Trinitas Hosp., 1 A.3d 823, 827 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).
12. See id. 
13. See id. 
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 This is a medical futility dispute, and such disputes occur frequently in health 
care facilities across the United States.14 They have even been called “one of the most 
contentious issues in health care.”15 In this article, I both describe and assess the 
mechanisms that health care providers can use to resolve medical futility disputes.
 In Part II, I identify three distinctive features of medical futility disputes. First, 
they usually concern life-sustaining medical treatment (such as dialysis) for a patient 
in a hospital’s intensive care unit (ICU). Second, the patient typically lacks 
decisionmaking capacity. Mr. Betancourt, for example, was permanently unconscious. 
Consequently, a surrogate must make treatment decisions on the patient’s behalf. 
Third, the surrogate and the patient’s physician disagree over the treatment plan. 
The surrogate wants to continue life-sustaining treatment, but the physician thinks 
that this treatment is non-beneficial and that continuing it would be medically and 
ethically inappropriate. Accordingly, the physician wants to stop such interventions 
and instead focus on comfort measures only.
 Such conflicts occur frequently. Yet, in Part III, I establish that medical futility 
disputes can usually be prevented or resolved informally. With better communication 
and better documentation of patients’ end-of-life treatment preferences, there will be 
fewer conflicts.16 Even to the extent that futility disputes continue to arise, they can 
almost always be resolved informally within the hospital. The parties are able to 
eventually reach consensus in 95% of medical futility disputes. Only around 5% 
remain intractable.17
 In Part IV, I address the resolution of these intractable futility conflicts. Most of 
them can be resolved through what I call “surrogate replacement.” The clinician may 
not be able to get consent from the current, authorized surrogate to stop life-sustaining 
treatment. But the clinician can often replace that surrogate with a new decisionmaker 
who will provide consent. After all, when the surrogate demands aggressive measures 
that offer the patient little or no benefit yet impose significant burdens, it is likely that 
she is exceeding the scope of her decisionmaking authority by failing to act consistently 
with the patient’s wishes or best interests.18
14. See, e.g., Terrah J. Paul Olson et al., Surgeon Reported Conflict with Intensivists About Postoperative Goals 
of Care, 148 JAMA Surgery 29, 29 (2013) (“[M]ore than 70% of ICU clinicians report experiencing 
conf lict weekly.”); John M. Luce & Douglas B. White, The Pressure to Withhold or Withdraw Life-
Sustaining Therapy from Critically Ill Patients in the United States, 175 Am. J. Respiratory & Critical 
Care Med. 1104, 1104–07 (2007) (“[D]isagreements between families and clinicians on end-of-life 
care are commonplace in the United States.”); Keith M. Swetz et al., Report of 255 Clinical Ethics 
Consultations and Review of the Literature, 82 Mayo Clinic Proc. 686, 689–90 (2007) (finding that 
futility disputes are one of the primary reasons for hospital ethics consultations); Thaddeus M. Pope, 
Surrogate Selection: An Increasingly Viable, but Limited, Solution to Intractable Futility Disputes, 3 St. 
Louis U. J. Health L. & Pol’y 183, 203–04 (2010) (collecting studies).
15. Ruth A. Mickelson et al., The Barnes Case: Taking Difficult Futility Cases Public, 41 J.L. Med. & Ethics 
374, 377 (2013) (citing J. Breslin et al., Top 10 Health Care Ethics Challenges Facing the Public: Views of 
Toronto Bioethicists, 6 BMC Med. Ethics 5 (2005)).
16. See infra Part III.A.
17. See infra Part III.B.
18. See infra Part IV.A.
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 But there are limitations to surrogate replacement as a dispute resolution 
mechanism.19 Some surrogates cannot be replaced. For example, the surrogate, often 
for religious reasons, may be making the very same treatment decisions that the 
patient would have made for herself. Such a surrogate is a faithful and loyal agent. 
The conflict arises not from a discord between the patient and her surrogate, but 
rather from discord between the patient (or at least her wishes and values) and her 
clinician. In such cases, the clinician may want to take unilateral action and stop life-
sustaining treatment without either patient or surrogate consent.
 In Part V, I outline the three main legal approaches that the states have taken 
with respect to health care providers unilaterally withholding or withdrawing life-
sustaining medical treatment. First, some states affirmatively permit clinicians to 
stop life-sustaining treatment without patient or surrogate consent. I refer to these as 
“green light” states.20 Second, some states categorically prohibit clinicians from 
stopping life-sustaining treatment without consent. I refer to these as “red light” 
states.21 Third, some states provide vague and uncertain guidance about whether 
clinicians may stop life-sustaining treatment without consent. I refer to these as 
“yellow light” states.22
 I conclude Part V by evaluating these three dispute resolution procedures. Both 
red light and green light states increase the risk of error. Red light states constrain 
clinician discretion because they mandate life-sustaining treatment even in 
circumstances where the administration of such treatment is medically and ethically 
inappropriate. On the other hand, green light states give too much unaccountable 
discretion to clinicians because they permit clinicians to stop life-sustaining treatment 
with minimal oversight, increasing the risk that clinicians will stop even medically 
and ethically appropriate treatment. I argue that yellow light states offer the greatest 
opportunity for improvement. They have not only the legal safe harbor immunity of 
green light states, but also the oversight and accountability that green light states lack.
 In the face of incommensurable value conf lict, a pure process-based dispute 
resolution is the best we can hope for. The trick lies in striking the right balance 
between fairness and efficiency. On the one hand, we want a dispute resolution 
process that is accessible, quick, convenient, and cost-effective. On the other hand, 
we want a process that provides the important safeguards of expertise, neutrality, and 
careful deliberation. The status quo is unacceptable. Green light states are efficient, 
but insufficiently fair. Yellow light states are fair, but insufficiently efficient.
 I propose that the adjudicatory authority of intramural hospital ethics committees 
be relocated to multi-institutional ethics committees. That way, no single institution’s 
ethics committee would have a controlling voice in the adjudication of its own 
dispute. A multi-institutional ethics committee preserves the expertise and 
extrajudicial nature of ethics committees. But in contrast to an intramural ethics 
19. See infra Part IV.B.
20. See infra Part V.B.
21. See infra Part V.A.
22. See infra Part V.C.
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committee, a multi-institutional ethics committee possesses better resources, a 
greater diversity of perspectives, and the neutrality and independence required by 
procedural due process.
II. WHAT IS A MEDICAL FUTILITY DISPUTE?
 A medical futility dispute is one in which the parties disagree over whether a 
current or proposed medical intervention is medically and ethically appropriate.23 
The paradigmatic medical futility dispute is one in which the surrogate requests 
aggressive treatment interventions for an imminently dying or catastrophically 
chronically ill patient. However, that patient’s health care providers consider such 
treatment to be medically or ethically inappropriate.
 Medical futility disputes can concern any type of medical intervention.24 But 
most of the relevant legislative and judicial activity, as well as most of the academic 
commentary, involve disputes over life-sustaining medical treatment.25 There are 
three distinctive features of such disputes.
 First, disputes over life-sustaining medical treatment involve life-and-death 
stakes. They usually concern patients in a hospital ICU. Life-sustaining medical 
treatment utilizes mechanical or other artificial means to sustain, restore, or supplant 
an individual’s spontaneous vital function. Life-sustaining medical treatment 
procedures include: assisted ventilation, renal dialysis, cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
(CPR), antibiotics, chemotherapy, and artificial nutrition and hydration.26 Typically, 
withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment will result in the 
patient’s death.
 Second, ICU patients dependent on life-sustaining medical treatment almost 
never have decisionmaking capacity.27 They lack the “ability to understand the 
23. See generally Thaddeus M. Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to Unilaterally Stop Life-
Sustaining Treatment, 75 Tenn. L. Rev. 1, 6–42 (2007) [hereinafter Pope, No Safe Harbor]; Thaddeus 
M. Pope, Medical Futility, in Guidance for Healthcare Ethics Comms. 88, 89–97 (Micah D. 
Hester & Toby Schonfeld eds., 2012) [hereinafter Pope, Medical Futility].
24. See, e.g., The Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reproductive Med., Fertility Treatment When the 
Prognosis Is Very Poor or Futile: A Committee Opinion, 98 Fertility & Sterility e6, e7 (2012).
25. See generally Thaddeus M. Pope, Involuntary Passive Euthanasia in U.S. Courts: Reassessing the Judicial 
Treatment of Medical Futility Cases, 9 Marquette Elder’s Advisor 229 (2008) [hereinafter Pope, 
Involuntary Passive Euthanasia].
26. AMA Code of Medical Ethics § 2.20 (1989). Other life-sustaining treatments include vasopressors, 
pacemakers, and intra-aortic balloon pumps. See Kathleen M. Stacy, Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining 
Treatment: A Case Study, 32 Am. Ass’n of Critical Care Nurses 14, 20 (2012).
27. See Simon Cohen et al., Communication of End-of-Life Decisions in European Intensive Care Units, 31 
Intensive Care Med. 1215, 1216 (2005) (“Of the total 4,248 patients 195 (5%) were mentally 
competent at the time a decision was made to perform CPR, withhold or withdraw therapy or shortening 
of the dying process.”); Marshall B. Kapp, Legal Liability Anxieties in the ICU, in Managing Death in 
the ICU: The Transition from Cure to Comfort 231, 236–37 (J. Randall Curtis & Gordon D. 
Rubenfeld eds., 2001); Alexandre Lautrette et al., Surrogate Decision Makers for Incompetent ICU Patients: 
A European Perspective, 14 Current Opinions Critical Care 714, 716 (2008) (discussing the capacity 
of patients and the use of surrogates in the ICU); Thomas J. Prendergast et al., A National Survey of 
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significant benefits, risks, and alternatives to proposed health care and to make and 
communicate a health care decision.”28 They cannot direct their own medical 
treatment. Consequently, medical treatment decisions for ICU patients must be 
made by a substitute decisionmaker or surrogate.29
 Third, the typical futility dispute is between the attending physician and the 
surrogate.30 The clinician says “stop,” but the surrogate says “go.” The clinician thinks 
that life-sustaining measures are no longer medically indicated and that the 
appropriate treatment plan is for comfort measures only.31 The surrogate, on the 
other hand, rejects this proposed treatment plan, and directs the clinician to continue 
life-sustaining measures.32
III. PREVENTION AND INFORMAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
 A. Prevention
 It is better to prevent futility disputes from arising in the first place than to work 
at resolving them after they have arisen. In fact, prevention is not terribly complicated 
or difficult. Most patients do not even want aggressive treatment at the end of life.33 
Suppose that these patients still had capacity and could make their own treatment 
End-of-Life Care for Critically Ill Patients, 158 Am. J. Respiratory Care Med. 1163, 1166 (1998); 
Susan M. Parks & Laraine Winter, End-of-Life Decision Making for Cancer Patients, 36 Primary Care 
Clinical Office Prac. 811, 813 (2009) (“Most Americans are decisionally incapacitated at the time of 
death, usually because of dementia, delirium, coma, or PVS [(persistent vegetative state)].”); Maria J. 
Silveira et al., Advance Directives and Outcomes of Surrogate Decision Making Before Death, 362 New Eng. 
J. Med. 1211, 1214 (2010); Elizabeth K. Vig et al., Beyond Substituted Judgment: How Surrogates Navigate 
End-of-Life Decision Making, 54 J. Am. Geriatrics Soc’y 1688 (2006).
28. Del. Code. Ann. tit. 16, § 2501(d) (West 2013).
29. The surrogate can be appointed either by the patient (agent) or by the court (guardian or conservator). 
Most surrogates are appointed by the attending physician pursuant to statutory default rules. See 
Thaddeus M. Pope, Legal Fundamentals of Surrogate Decision Making, 141 Chest 1074 (2012) 
[hereinafter Pope, Legal Fundamentals].
30. While medical futility disputes are paradigmatically between the responsible physician and the 
surrogate, there are three other types. First, there is intra-professional conflict, between members of the 
treatment team. Second, there is intra-familial conflict, between members of the patient’s family. Third, 
there are questions regarding patients without any available surrogates.
31. “More often . . . it is the medical team that [first] comes to the moment of declaring futility, concluding 
that further aggressive interventions are not accomplishing the patient’s goals of care, and often that 
additional medical interventions will only cause pain and suffering. When the family disagrees and 
insists that treatment continue, dispute arises.” Cmty. Ethics Comm., Medical Futility: Strategies 
for Dispute Resolution when Expectations and Limits of Treatment Collide 6 (2013).
32. For a summary of the reasons and causes of medical futility disputes, see Pope, No Safe Harbor, supra 
note 23, at 10–20.
33. See Thaddeus M. Pope, Clinicians May Not Administer Life-Sustaining Treatment Without Consent: Civil, 
Criminal, and Disciplinary Sanctions, 9 J. Health & Biomed. L. 213, 230–31 (2013) [hereinafter Pope, 
Life-Sustaining Treatment] (“In one recent survey, 67% would prefer to ‘die a natural death’ if their 
heartbeat or breathing stopped while only 7% would want medical providers to ‘use everything to 
prolong life.’”).
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decisions. They and their clinicians would agree on the appropriate treatment plan, 
and there would be no conflict.34
 But the patients who are the subjects of futility disputes lack capacity and cannot 
make their own treatment decisions. In such circumstances, they are presumed to 
want life-sustaining treatment unless they have adequately rebutted that presumption. 
Unfortunately, most patients have not “opted out” of pro-life default rules. As a 
result, they receive treatment that they would not have wanted and that their 
clinicians do not want to administer.
 Fortunately, rapidly expanding initiatives are helping patients to better understand 
their options and to better document their treatment preferences.35 Here are just four 
of these initiatives: First, clinicians are getting better at engaging patients in end-of-
life treatment discussions.36 They are fostering more realistic expectations through 
establishing goals of care early on and evaluating them routinely. And, increasingly, 
this education and training on end-of-life communication is legally mandated.37
 Second, some states specifically require clinicians to disclose treatment options 
like palliative care and hospice.38 When patients are aware of the risks and benefits 
of, and alternatives to, continued curative-directed treatment, most decline such 
treatment. Most of us prioritize quality of life over quantity of life.39
34. See Dominic J.C. Wilkinson, Ethics in Medicine: Is It a Futile Exercise?, 198 Med. J. Austl. 220, 220 
(2013) (“Advance care planning increases the chance that patients’ own wishes are known and respected 
at the end of life. This is likely to reduce the provision of unwanted and inappropriate treatment and 
may reduce disputes.”); Cameron L. Stewart, Legal Perspective on Consent in Disputes About Futile Care, 
98 Med. J. Austl. 225, 225 (2013) (arguing that an advance directive can prevent conf lict); Press 
Release, Winnipeg Health Region, Access to End-of-Life Supports and Resources to Increase for 
Patients, Families and Professionals (Mar. 25, 2011), available at http://www.wrha.mb.ca/media/
releases/2011/110325.php (rejecting a “legislated or internal review process” in favor of a focus on 
prevention).
35. Sometimes conf lict is avoided because certain treatment options are never even presented to the 
surrogate. See, e.g., John D. Lantos & William L. Meadow, Should the “Slow Code” Be Resuscitated?, 11 
Am. J. Bioethics 8, 11 (2011); David A. Asch et al., Decisions to Limit or Continue Life-Sustaining 
Treatment by Critical Care Physicians in the United States: Conflicts Between Physicians’ Practices and 
Patients’ Wishes, 151 Am. J. Respiratory Critical Care Med. 288 (1995). While there is no conflict, 
there is, arguably, a lack of adequate informed consent.
36. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Peppercorn et al., American Society of Clinical Oncology Statement: Toward 
Individualized Care for Patients with Advanced Cancer, 29 J. Clinical Oncology 755 (2011); Anne 
Rinehart, Beyond the Futility Argument: The Fair Process Approach and Time-Limited Trials for Managing 
Dialysis Conflict, 8 Clinical J. Am. Soc’y Nephrology 2000 (2013).
37. See, e.g., N.Y. Assemb. A. 8176A, 47th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2012).
38. See, e.g., Palliative Care Information Act, N.Y. Pub. Health L. § 2997-c (McKinney 2013); Cal. 
Health & Safety Code § 442.5 (West 2013); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 1871 (2013). 
39. See Daren K. Heyland et al., Failure to Engage Hospitalized Elderly Patients and Their Families in Advance 
Care Planning, 173 JAMA Internal Med. 778 (2013), available at www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pubmed/23545563; Pope, Life-Sustaining Treatment, supra note 33, at 221; Views on End-of-Life Medical 
Treatments, Pew Res. Ctr. (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.pewforum.org/2013/11/21/views-on-end-of-
life-medical-treatments/.
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 Third, with the growth of patient decision aids, both patients and surrogates 
better understand and appreciate the available choices.40 Decision aids are educational 
tools that help patients understand the various treatment options available to them, 
including the risks and benefits of each choice.41 These tools include evidence-based 
educational literature with graphics, photographs, and diagrams.42 They also take 
the form of videos, website-based interactive programs such as sequential questions 
with feedback, and “structured personal coaching.”43
 Patients who use decision aids are more knowledgeable about treatment options, 
less conf licted about their decisions, and more likely to play an active role in 
decisionmaking than patients who do not use decision aids.44 Consequently, the 
patients who use decision aids may be better able to align their care with their 
preferences and values. Moreover, patients using decision aids are more likely to choose 
conservative treatment options, are less likely to choose surgical interventions, and are 
less likely to be admitted to the hospital.45 They are also less likely to choose CPR.46
 Fourth, the Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment (POLST) helps to 
address all of these problems. Meant to supplement, not replace, traditional advance 
directives for those patients expected to die within the next year, POLST has several 
advantages that help ensure that patients’ treatment preferences are documented in a 
manner that clinicians will find, understand, and honor.47
 First, POLST is usually created with a health care provider at or near the time 
when an acute or serious chronic condition develops. It addresses the patient’s current 
situation, not a possible future scenario. Consequently, POLST has a greater chance 
of being more informed and more relevant to the specific medical situation at hand. 
Second, since the POLST form is highly visible, portable, and travels with the 
patient’s medical records, it is more likely available at the time that a decision must be 
made. Third, since POLST is written in precise medical language on a standardized 
40. See Thaddeus M. Pope & Melinda Hexum, Legal Briefing: Shared Decision Making and Patient Decision 
Aids, 24 J. Clinical Ethics 70 (2013).
41. See Martha Hostetter & Sarah Klein, Quality Matters, Helping Patients Make Better Treatment Decisions 
with Decision Aids, The Commonwealth, http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Newsletters/Quality-
Matters/2012/October-November/In-Focus.aspx (last visited Dec. 24, 2013).
42. See, e.g., Nadia N. Sawicki, Patient Protection and Decision-Aid Quality: Regulatory and Tort Law 
Approaches, 54 Ariz. L. Rev. 621, 631 (2012); Marshall H. Chin, The Patient’s Role in Choice of 
Medications: Direct-to-Consumer Advertising and Patient Decision Aids, 5 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & 
Ethics 771, 782 (2005).
43. Pope & Hexum, supra note 40.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See Thaddeus M. Pope & Melinda Hexum, POLST: Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment, 23 J. 
Clinical Ethics 353 (2012).
355
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 58 | 2013/14
form, it is better understood by health care providers. Fourth, since POLST is signed 
by a provider, there is a greater chance of compliance by other providers.48
 Most patients do not want continued life-sustaining treatment when they are 
chronically critically ill. If these patients documented their treatment preferences, 
most futility disputes could be avoided. Nevertheless, most patients still fail to record 
their wishes before losing capacity. Consequently, most ICU treatment decisions are 
made by surrogates. But here, too, there is room to implement preventative measures.
 Most surrogates find themselves performing a new role, for the first time, under 
difficult circumstances. Therefore, health care providers should advise the surrogate 
of the duties of a good substitute decisionmaker and provide statistical information 
on patient preferences.49 When surrogates are adequately trained and supported, they 
make decisions that better align with patient preferences, reducing the likelihood of 
medical futility disputes.50
 B. Informal Dispute Resolution
 If prevention has failed and conflict has obtained, informal dispute resolution 
mechanisms work almost all of the time. Through further communication and 
mediation, consensus is reached in over 95% of medical futility cases.51 If the treatment 
team is not getting anywhere with the surrogate, it can invite the intervention of 
ethics consultants, social workers, chaplains, palliative care clinicians, the ethics 
committee, external second opinions, and other experts.52
 Only around 5% of disputes remain intractable.53 In these cases, the physician 
and surrogate cannot find common ground. But there are still alternatives. Consensus 
can still sometimes be reached by “replacing” the physician or hospital. While the 
48. See id.
49. See, e.g., ABA Comm’n on Law & Aging, Making Medical Decisions for Someone Else: A 
How-To Guide (2009).
50. See supra Part III.A.
51. See, e.g., Craig M. Nelson & Blanca Arriola Nazareth, Nonbeneficial Treatment and Conflict Resolution: 
Building Consensus, 17 Permanente J. 23 (2013) (reporting consensus in eighty-seven of ninety-two 
cases); Robert L. Fine, Point: The Texas Advance Directives Act Effectively and Ethically Resolves Disputes 
About Medical Futility, 136 Chest 963 (2009); Robert L. Fine & Thomas W. Mayo, Resolution of 
Futility by Due Process: Early Experience with the Texas Advance Directives Act, 138 Annals Internal 
Med. 743 (2003); Daniel Garros et al., Circumstances Surrounding End of Life in a Pediatric Intensive Care 
Unit, 112 Pediatrics e371 (2003); Emily Ramshaw, Bills Challenge Care Limits for Terminal Patients, 
Dallas Morning News, Feb. 15, 2007; Thomas J. Prendergast & John M. Luce, Increasing Incidence of 
Withholding and Withdrawal of Life Support from the Critically Ill, 155 Am. J Respiratory & Critical 
Care Med. 15 (1997).
52. See generally Thaddeus M. Pope & Ellen A. Waldman, Mediation at the End-of-Life: Getting Beyond the 
Limits of the Talking Cure, 23 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 143 (2007); Thaddeus M. Pope, Medical 
Futility, in Guidance for Healthcare Ethics Committees 88 (Micah D. Hester & Toby Schonfeld 
eds., 2012).
53. This is still a substantial number of disputes. For example, take just the one thousand tertiary hospitals 
in the United States. Each has roughly one futility case per month. That is twelve thousand futility 
disputes. If 5% of those are intractable, that is six hundred cases.
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current health care provider may be unwilling to administer the surrogate-requested 
treatment, it is sometimes possible to transfer the patient to another physician or 
facility that is willing to provide the disputed treatment, thereby “replacing” the 
physician or hospital.54
IV.  SURROGATE REPLACEMENT: OBTAINING CONSENT FROM ANOTHER 
DECISIONMAKER
 Clinicians do not want to act contrary to their professional judgment. Nor do they 
want to act without patient or surrogate consent. In a medical futility dispute, these 
two objectives come into conflict. But they are not irreconcilable or mutually exclusive.
 Consistent with both of these objectives, there are three ways to reach consensus 
in a futility dispute.55 First, as discussed above, the clinician might eventually get 
consent from the surrogate.56 Second, also discussed above, the clinician might find 
a new health care provider willing to provide the treatment that the surrogate wants.
 Third, if neither of these solutions is possible, the clinician is often able to replace the 
current surrogate with a new surrogate who will consent to the recommended treatment 
plan. This is the mirror image of the second path to consensus. Instead of transferring 
the patient to a new health care provider who agrees with the surrogate, the clinician 
replaces the current surrogate with a new surrogate who agrees with the clinician.
 A. Surrogate Replacement
 A surrogate is an “extension of the patient” and stands in the shoes of the patient. 
Accordingly, the surrogate must make the choice that the patient, if competent, 
would have made for herself.57 The standards for surrogate decisionmaking are 
substantially uniform across the country. There is generally a two-step hierarchy. 
First, the surrogate should try to infer the patient’s wishes from her prior statements 
54. See, e.g., Kate Dubinski, Baby Joseph Flown to U.S. Hospital, Toronto Sun (Mar. 13, 2011, 10:48 PM), 
http://www.torontosun.com/news/canada/2011/03/13/17601961.html (reporting that the parents of 
Joseph Maraachli transferred him from London Health Sciences Centre in Toronto to Cardinal Glennon 
Children’s Hospital in St. Louis); Todd Ackerman, Teen’s Transfer Defuses Life Support Battle, Houston 
Chron. (July 1, 2011), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Teen-s-transfer-defuses-life-
support-battle-2078227.php (reporting that Jordan Allen was transferred from Texas Children’s Hospital 
to a long-term acute-care facility just five days before the hospital’s plan to remove his life support).
55. A fourth way in which consensus might be reached is that the surrogate might convince (or intimidate) 
the clinician. After all, “in many instances, doctors who are eager to avoid a fight submit to a family’s 
request, even if they believe the patient is beyond care.” Nicholas Hune-Brown, A Life Interrupted, 
Toronto Life, Dec. 2012, at 65, 67. See also Robert Sibbald et al., Perceptions of ‘Futile Care’ Among 
Caregivers in Intensive Care Units, 177 Canadian Med. Ass’n J. 1201 (2007); Pope & Waldman, supra 
note 52, at 170–85.
56. See Hune-Brown, supra note 55, at 67 (“After a few days of seeing their loved ones on life support, some 
families acquiesce.”).
57. In fact, surrogates are not very good at carrying out this duty. Numerous studies confirm that the choices 
surrogates make for patients are often not the same choices that patients would make for themselves. See 
Thaddeus M. Pope, Surrogate Selection: An Increasingly Viable, but Limited, Solution to Intractable Futility 
Disputes, 3 St. Louis U. J. Health L. & Pol’y 183, 215–23 (2010) (collecting studies).
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and conduct, and make decisions that conform as closely as possible to what the 
patient would have done under the circumstances. Second, in the absence of reliable 
evidence of the patient’s expressed wishes, values, or preferences, the surrogate must 
rely on more objective grounds and shift her focus from the wishes of the patient to 
the welfare of the patient.58
 Surrogates who deviate from these decisionmaking standards, which they are 
supposed to employ, can and should be replaced.59 Indeed, courts across the United 
States have replaced surrogates in four types of situations. First, they have replaced 
surrogates who have a material conflict of interest. For example, parents who are accused 
of child abuse may not consent to stopping life support for their abused (and often 
catastrophically brain-injured) child, because they want to avoid homicide charges.60
 Second, courts have replaced surrogates who make treatment decisions that 
contradict written instructions in the patient’s advance directive.61 For example, the 
Hennepin County, Minnesota probate court removed Lana Barnes as her husband’s 
surrogate.62 The court determined that she was requesting the same treatment that 
her husband had specifically refused in his advance directive.63 Unless the patient has 
granted permission for such deviation, surrogates exceed the scope of their authority 
when they act inconsistently with the patient’s advance directive.64
 These two types of surrogate replacement cases are reasonably straightforward. It is 
relatively easy to make the case for replacing both those surrogates who have material 
conflicts of interest and those surrogates who act in contravention of the patient’s 
clearly applicable advance directive. But courts have been replacing surrogates in even 
the more difficult cases.
 The third type of case in which courts have replaced surrogates is one in which 
the surrogate makes treatment decisions in contradiction of the patient’s known 
preferences, wishes, or values.65 For example, a West Virginia court approved a 
settlement in which the hospital intended to “remove the Plaintiff as surrogate” 
58. See id. at 212–14.
59. See id.; see also Cameron L. Stewart, A Defence of the Requirement to Seek Consent to Withhold and Withdraw 
Futile Treatment, 196 Med. J. Austl. 406, 407 (2012). To be clear, I am not advocating that clinicians 
immediately move to replace surrogates in all conf lict situations. They should first try to avoid and 
informally resolve such conflict. See Douglas B. White, Rethinking Interventions to Improve Surrogate 
Decision Making in Intensive Care Units, 20 Am. J. Critical Care 252, 252–57 (2011); Christian J. 
Wiedermann et al., From Persistence to Palliation: Limiting Active Treatment in the ICU, 18 Current 
Opinions Critical Care 693, 693–99 (2012).
60. See, e.g., Alberta v. D.L., 2012 ABCA 275 (Can.).
61. See, e.g., Strong Memorial Hosp. v. Livadas, No. 08-03730, slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Monroe Cnty. Apr. 
28, 2008), available at http://www.thaddeuspope.com/images/Livadas_-_ruling_08-2008.pdf.
62. See, e.g., In re Emergency Guardship of Barnes, No. 27-GC-PR-111-16 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Feb. 4, 
2001) (order appointing emergency guardian), available at http://www.thaddeuspope.com/images/
Barnes_Court_Ruling_02-04-11.pdf.
63. See id.
64. See Pope, Life-Sustaining Treatment, supra note 33, at 232–34.
65. See id. at 234–37 (collecting cases).
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because of evidence that the patient “would refuse the level of medical intervention 
and treatment decided by the Plaintiff.”66
 Fourth, courts have replaced surrogates even when there is no evidence of patient 
preferences, wishes, or values. Unable to apply a subjective standard, the court instead 
applies an objective standard and replaces surrogates who fail to make treatment decisions 
in the patient’s best interests.67 For example, in a medical futility case at the Massachusetts 
General Hospital, a Boston judge told the patient’s daughter that her “own personal 
issues” were impacting her decision and urged her to “refocus” her assessment.68
 In a second case, the same hospital successfully moved the local probate court to 
“override” a health care agent’s refusal to consent to a DNAR order.69 In granting the 
hospital’s petition, the court explained that since the agent was “in denial” about his 
mother’s deterioration and distrustful of her providers, he had not given “full 
consideration of acceptable medical alternatives.”70
 While this guidance from courts is useful, it is important to emphasize that 
clinicians can almost always replace surrogates without judicial intervention.71 First, 
most states permit clinicians to decline to comply with the health care decision of a 
surrogate if the clinician believes in good faith that the surrogate lacks the authority to 
make such a decision.72 Second, some states permit the physician to unilaterally 
recognize the authority of a new surrogate.73 Third, other states authorize the hospital’s 
own ethics committee to adjudicate disputes between and among surrogates.74
 B. Limitations of Surrogate Replacement
 While the courts have been willing to replace surrogates in medical futility 
disputes, they will not, and probably cannot, replace surrogates in all such cases.75 
Similarly, clinicians cannot replace surrogates in all such disputes.
66. Verified Complaint and Motion at 5, Kisner v. W. Va. Univ. Hosps. Inc., No. 10-C-190 (W. Va. Cir. 
Ct. Mar. 25, 2010).
67. See Pope, Life-Sustaining Treatment, supra note 33, at 229–41 (collecting cases).
68. See Liz Kowalczyk, Plan to Take Woman off Life Support Is Halted, Bos. Globe, Feb. 23, 2005, at B1; 
Daughter Explains Agreement to End Care, Bos. Globe, Mar. 23, 2005, at B2.
69. See In re Guardianship of Mason, 669 N.E.2d 1081 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996).
70. Id. at 1082.
71. Replacing a rogue surrogate is not only an option, but also a duty. See, e.g., Cardoza v. USC Univ. Hosp., 
No. B195092, 2008 WL 3413312 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2008).
72. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 13.52.030(h) (2013); Cal. Prob. Code § 4740(b) (West 2013).
73. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-1806(c)(1) (West 2013).
74. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 2507(b)(8) (West 2013); Md. Code Ann. Health-Gen. § 5-605(b)(1) 
(West 2013).
75. See, e.g., Cuthbertson v. Rasouli, 2013 SCC 53 ¶¶ 148–50 (Can.) (Karakatsanis, J., dissenting); Scardoni 
v. Hawryluck, 2004 ONSC 34236 (Can.) (reversing tribunal’s replacement of surrogate, because there was 
evidence that the patient really did desire the treatment requested by her surrogate); In re Cobb, No. 2011-
0805 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pl. Lehigh Cnty. Dec. 5, 2012), aff ’d, No. J-A15634/13 (Pa. July 31, 2013).
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 In some cases, clinicians cannot establish that the surrogate is deviating from the 
applicable decisionmaking standard. There are two main reasons that clinicians 
cannot establish surrogate deviation. First, the evidence regarding the patient’s 
preferences or best interests may be non-existent or ambiguous.76 Since too few 
individuals engage in adequate advance-care planning, applicable instructions and 
other evidence regarding patient preferences are rarely available. Consequently, it is 
often difficult or impossible to detect or demonstrate a contradiction between the 
patient’s preferences and the surrogate’s decision.
 Second, even when there is evidence of the patient’s preferences, the surrogate 
may be acting faithfully and consistently with them.77 For example, the surrogate 
may be requesting continued life-sustaining treatment because the patient’s religion 
mandates it.78
V. UNILATERAL ACTION: STOPPING WITHOUT CONSENT
 If the clinician cannot get consent from the current surrogate and cannot replace 
that surrogate (and get consent from a new surrogate), then the clinician may want to 
take unilateral action.79 While the clinician would prefer to act with consent, she 
may be professionally and personally concerned that the burdens of continued 
treatment for the patient seriously outweigh any potential benefits. Consequently, 
the clinician may want to stop life-sustaining treatment even without consent.
 Whether a clinician can take such unilateral action without risking sanctions is a 
matter of state law. The states have taken three main approaches. These three 
approaches can be conveniently represented by the colors of a traffic light: red, green, 
and yellow. Red light states specifically prohibit clinicians from stopping life-
sustaining treatment without surrogate consent. Green light states specifically allow 
it. And yellow light states provide uncertain guidance.
 A. Red Lights: Clinicians May Not Stop Treatment Without Consent
 Some states forbid physicians from stopping life-sustaining treatment without 
surrogate consent. In New York, for example, a clinician who objects to a surrogate’s 
76. See Pope, Life-Sustaining Treatment, supra note 33, at 247–50; Pope, Legal Fundamentals, supra note 29, 
at 1079.
77. See Pope, Life-Sustaining Treatment, supra note 33, at 244–47; Pope, Legal Fundamentals, supra note 29, 
at 1078.
78. See, e.g., Golubchuk v. Salvation Army Grace Hosp., 2008 MBQB 49 (Can.). In such cases, surrogates 
cannot be replaced. See, e.g., In re S.S., 2011 CanLII 5000 (Can. Ont. C.C.B.); In re D.W., 2011 CanLII 
18217 (Can. Ont. C.C.B.) (showing that most of the intractable cases are religiously motivated); see also 
Lucas Zier et al., Surrogate Decision Makers’ Responses to Physicians’ Predictions of Medical Futility, 136 
Chest 110 (2009), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2716715/.
79. Procedurally, clinicians could pursue a fourth path. They could seek permission directly from a court. 
But the analysis would be similar to surrogate selection. Moreover, such requests are often unsuccessful. 
See Pope, Involuntary Passive Euthanasia, supra note 25, at 248–51. But see Aintree Univ. Hosp. NHS 
Found. Trust v. James, [2013] EWCA (Civ) 65 (Eng.), aff ’d, [2013] UKSC 67. In short, it is usually 
easier for clinicians to beg for forgiveness than to ask for permission.
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request for life-sustaining treatment “shall nonetheless comply.”80 In Minnesota, a 
provider who is “unwilling to provide directed health care” must “take all reasonable 
steps to ensure provision of the directed health care until the [patient] is transferred.”81
 A number of other states have been swinging from yellow to red. For example, in 
2012, Idaho enacted the Discrimination in Denial of Life-Preserving Treatment 
Act.82 This statute mandates that health care “may not be withdrawn or denied if its 
provision is directed” by a surrogate.83 Oklahoma enacted similar legislation, the 
Nondiscrimination in Treatment Act, in 2013.84 And comparable bills were considered 
in Alaska85 and Virginia.86
 In addition to these statutory “substantive” red lights, there are also “procedural” 
red lights. In futility disputes, surrogates can, and often do, go to court and obtain 
temporary restraining orders and temporary injunctions.87 Courts traditionally 
consider four factors in determining whether to grant such relief: (1) the probability 
of the plaintiff ’s success on the merits, (2) the irreparable nature of harm to the 
plaintiff, (3) the balance of hardship between the parties, and (4) the public interest.88
 Plaintiffs can usually satisfy these factors, given the life-and-death stakes, the 
relative vulnerability of the patient, and the uncertainty of the law and facts.89 So 
judges preserve the status quo (the administration of life-sustaining treatment) until 
arguments and evidence can be mustered for adjudication. But this often results in a 
fait accompli. The judicial process is so slow and cumbersome that the patient often 
80. N.Y. Pub. Health L. §§ 2994-f(3), 2984 (McKinney 2013).
81. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 145C.15 (West 2013). While the New York statute applies to both surrogates and 
agents, the Minnesota statute applies only to agents.
82. S.B. 1348, 65th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2012) (codified at Idaho Code Ann. § 39-4514(3) (West 
2013)).
83. Idaho Code Ann. § 39-4514(3). The statute does contain a “futile care” exception, but it is very narrow 
and inapplicable to almost all futility disputes. “Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require 
medical treatment that is medically inappropriate or futile.” This is defined as treatment for a patient for 
whom “death is imminent within hours or at most a few days” or treatment the denial of which “will not 
result in or hasten the patient’s death.” Id. § 39-4514(6).
84. H.B. 1403, 54th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2013) (codified at Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 3090.2 (2013)). 
Similar legislation failed the previous year. S.B. 1695, 53d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2012).
85. S.B. 172, 27th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2012); H.B. 309, 27th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2012).
86. H.B. 2068, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2011).
87. See Pope, Involuntary Passive Euthanasia, supra note 25, at 251–54 (collecting cases).
88. See 11A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2947 (2d ed. 2013); 13 
James Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 65 (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2013).
89. See, e.g., Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Declaratory Judgment, In re M.B., No. 1:08-CV-01898-
HHK (D.C. Super. Ct. Fam. Div. 2008). But cf. Sweiss v. Alberta Health Serv., 2009 ABQB 691 (Can.) 
(granting only five days); Alberta CYFEA v. D.L., 2012 ABQB 562 (Can.); Alberta CYFEA v. D.L., 
2012 ABQB 562 ¶¶ 71–74 (Can.) (denying, after the case had already been before the court for six 
weeks, the parents’ request to further delay withdrawal of treatment from Baby M).
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dies before the court reaches the merits of the dispute.90 The surrogate gets what she 
wants, a de facto win, a red light.91
 B. Green Lights: Clinicians May Stop Treatment Without Consent
 While red light states specifically prohibit clinicians from stopping life-sustaining 
treatment without consent, green light states specifically allow it. There are three 
green lights in the United States. One is provided in the 1999 Texas Advance 
Directives Act (TADA). One is provided in some states’ statutes and regulations 
specific to CPR. And a third green light is provided by conscience clause statutes in 
some states.92
  1. Texas Advance Directives Act
 TADA permits physicians to refuse life-sustaining treatment without consent, 
for any reason, so long as an institutional committee agrees.93 A hospital must give 
the surrogate forty-eight hours’ notice before the institutional committee meeting 
occurs.94 If the committee agrees with the attending physician that life-sustaining 
treatment is inappropriate, the hospital must give the surrogate ten days after the 
meeting to find a facility that will provide the treatment desired.95 If the clinician 
follows these procedures, the statute provides civil, criminal, and disciplinary 
immunity to providers who stop life-sustaining treatment on the eleventh day.96
90. See Cmty. Ethics Comm., supra note 31, at 14 (“A guaranteed day in court to resolve a dispute is a 
darkly comic idea when that day is nine months away and the patient will not live more than weeks.”); 
Royal Soc’y of Can. Expert Panel, End-of-Life Decision Making 92 (2011) (“[G]iven the 
physical condition of most patients involved in such cases and given the time required for a case to work 
its way through the court system (especially for a matter of unsettled law), the results of litigation are 
often deeply unsatisfying for all involved.”).
91. See, e.g., Golubchuk v. Salvation Army Grace Gen. Hosp., 2008 MBQB 49 (Can.). The Betancourt case 
is a rare case in which the patient survived and the court reached the merits. See Betancourt v. Trinitas 
Hosp., No C-12-09, slip op. (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Mar. 4, 2009), available at http://www.
thaddeuspope.com/images/Betancourt_v_trinitas_3-4_2.pdf. But even in Betancourt, the patient died 
before appellate briefing could be completed. The court dismissed the appeal as moot. Douglas B. 
White & Thaddeus M. Pope, The Courts, Futility, and the Ends of Medicine, 307 JAMA 151 (2012).
92. There may be other green lights that apply in specific situations in other states. See, e.g., Marin v. 
Cleveland Clinic, No. 1:09-CV-2090, 2010 WL 359699, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 29, 2010) (“Ohio law 
allows a doctor or health care facility to refuse to comply with the instructions of an attorney-in-fact for 
any basis.”).
93. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 166.046 (West 2012). See generally Robert L. Fine, Point: The 
Texas Advance Directives Act Effectively and Ethically Resolves Disputes About Medical Futility, 136 Chest 963 
(2009); Robert D. Truog, Counterpoint: The Texas Advance Directives Act Is Ethically Flawed: Medical Futility 
Disputes Must be Resolved by a Fair Process, 136 Chest 968 (2009); Robert L. Fine, Rebuttal from Dr. Fine, 
136 Chest 971 (2009); Robert D. Truog, Rebuttal from Dr. Truog, 136 Chest 972 (2009).
94. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 166.046(b)(2).
95. See id. § 166.046(e).
96. See id. § 166.045(d).
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 TADA offers a clear, unambiguous legal safe harbor. Physicians in most U.S. 
jurisdictions are afraid to refuse surrogate-requested treatment that they deem 
inappropriate or even cruel. In contrast, TADA has proven effective at allowing 
physicians to avoid providing such treatment. Accordingly, other jurisdictions have 
been looking to TADA as a model.97
  2. DNAR Orders and POLST
 While Texas is the only state that expressly authorizes clinicians to unilaterally 
refuse any form of life-sustaining treatment, a few states authorize clinicians to 
unilaterally refuse one particular form of life-sustaining treatment: specifically, these 
states permit clinicians to refuse CPR by writing a DNAR order without consent.
 In Vermont, for example, clinicians can complete a Clinician Order for Life- 
Sustaining Treatment (COLST) directing that health care professionals not 
administer CPR to a patient who is not breathing or who has no pulse.98 Normally, 
the basis for a DNAR order is the informed consent of the patient or surrogate. But 
Vermont also allows the basis to be “futility.”99 The clinician can complete a COLST 
directing that no CPR be administered to a patient experiencing cardiopulmonary 
arrest if “resuscitation would not prevent the imminent death” of the patient.100
  3. Conscience-Based Objections
 TADA and the Vermont POLST regulations provide a green light for clinicians 
with professional objections to the requested treatment. In contrast, the third green 
light focuses on clinicians’ personal, conscience-based objections.
 Almost every state has a health care conscience clause.101 These laws permit 
clinicians to decline the provision of services that violate their religious or moral 
beliefs. For example, California law provides that “healthcare providers may decline to 
97. See, e.g., S.B. 1114, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2009); Cal. Med. Ass’n, Resolution 506-09: End-of-
Life Care and Futile Treatment, 2009 House of Delegates (2009), available at http://sdcms.org/
files/2009HODCommERes.pdf; Wash. State Med. Ass’n, Resolution A-2: WSMA Opinion on 
Medical Futility in End-of-Life Care, 2010 House of Delegates (Aug. 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.wsma.org/files/Downloads/AboutUs/pdf/ Official_Actions_2010.pdf; Brief for N.J. Hosp. 
Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Betancourt v. Trinitas Hosp., 1 A.3d 823 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2010); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Health Law Section, Summary Report on Healthcare 
Costs: Legal Issues, Barriers and Solutions (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.nysba.org/AM/
Template.cfm?Section=Home&ContentID=31639&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm.
98. See Vt. Dep’t of Health, Advance Directives for Health Care Rules, available at http://
healthvermont.gov/regs/ad/Advance_Directives_Rules.pdf. 
99. Id.
100. Id. Maryland also permits clinicians to write a Medical Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment 
(MOLSTs) on the basis of “medical ineffectiveness.” Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. § 5-611 (West 
2013); Md. Code Regs. 10.01.21 (2013); 39 Md. Reg. 1087–89 (Aug. 10, 2012) (rejecting comments 
expressing concern about this “medical ineffectiveness” path).
101. See Thaddeus M. Pope, Legal Briefing: Conscience Clauses and Conscientious Refusal, 21 J. Clinical 
Ethics 163 (2010); Thaddeus M. Pope, Conscientious Objection by Health Care Providers, 18 Lahey 
Clinic Med. Ethics J. 4 (2011).
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comply with an individual healthcare instruction or healthcare decision for reasons of 
conscience.”102 And the provider is afforded civil, criminal, and disciplinary immunity 
in exercising this refusal.103 Because some clinicians equate the administration of 
“futile” treatment with torture and inhumanity, they may make conscience-based 
refusals pursuant to such laws.104
 But conscience clauses are usually materially limited to balance clinician rights 
against patient needs. Accordingly, most conscience clauses require “treat ‘til transfer.” 
That is, they condition the provider’s right to refuse on transferring the patient to 
another provider who is willing to comply with the patient’s or surrogate’s treatment 
request. In most intractable futility disputes, transfer is not possible.105 Therefore, 
clinicians cannot effectively implement their right to conscientiously object and 
refuse treatment.
 But some states, like Mississippi, more broadly permit providers to not “participate 
in a healthcare service that violates his or her conscience.”106 The 2004 Mississippi 
Healthcare Rights of Conscience Act provides civil, criminal, and administrative 
immunity.107 And it does not require treat ‘til transfer or even referral to another 
provider.108 Other states have been considering similar unconditional conscience 
clauses.109
 C. Yellow Lights: Uncertainty Whether Clinicians May Stop Treatment Without Consent
 There are only a handful of red light and green light states. Most states provide 
clinicians with a yellow light. Statutes in these states neither clearly forbid nor clearly 
permit clinicians to unilaterally stop life-sustaining treatment. They leave clinicians 
uncertain about the legality of stopping without consent. Most yellow light states 
have statutes that purport to provide green lights. These statutes, like TADA, appear 
to provide legal safe harbor immunity.110 But, in contrast to TADA, this immunity 
depends upon the satisfaction of standards and conditions that clinicians cannot be 
sure are really satisfied.
102. Cal. Prob. Code § 4734(a) (West 2013).
103. Id. § 4740(d).
104. See, e.g., Liz Kowalczyk, Hospital, Family Spar over End-of-Life Care, Bos. Globe, Mar. 11, 2005, at A1, 
available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2005/03/11/hospital_family_
spar_over_end_of_life_care/ (“This inhumane travesty has gone far enough . . . . This is the 
Massachusetts General Hospital, not Auschwitz.”) (quoting In re Howe, No. 03Pl255, 2004 WL 
1446057, at *11 (Mass. Prob. & Fam. Ct. Mar. 22, 2004)).
105. See Pope, No Safe Harbor, supra note 23, at 59–61.
106. Miss. Code Ann. § 41-107-5(1) (West 2013).
107. See id. § 41-107-5(2).
108. See id. § 41-107-3.
109. See, e.g., H.B. 2460, 53d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2012); H.B. 279, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2013); S.B. 136, 
2013–2014 Sess. (Mich. 2013); L.B. 461, 102d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2011).
110. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 166.044 (West 2013).
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 For example, the California Probate Code states that a health care provider “may 
decline to comply with an individual health care instruction or health care decision 
that requires medically ineffective health care or health care contrary to generally 
accepted health care standards applicable to the health care provider.”111 And so long 
as the provider is acting in good faith, she will not be “subject to civil or criminal 
liability or to discipline for unprofessional conduct” for refusing to comply.112
 This California statute looks substantially similar to TADA at first. But closer 
examination shows it to be materially different. The conditions in TADA are 
concrete and measurable, for example: (a) give forty-eight hours’ notice of the ethics 
committee meeting, and (b) wait ten days.113 Texas clinicians know exactly if and 
when they have earned safe harbor immunity.
 In contrast, California clinicians can never be as confident, as it is unclear when 
the conditions in the California statute are satisfied. California permits clinicians to 
refuse surrogate treatment requests that are either “medically ineffective” or “contrary 
to generally accepted healthcare standards.”114 But these categories are practically 
useless. “Medical ineffectiveness” is so exceedingly narrow that it almost never 
applies.115 “Generally accepted healthcare standards” may be broader. But it is unclear 
which, if any, end-of-life health care standards are “generally accepted.”116
 Medically ineffective treatment is that which will not offer the patient “any 
significant benefit.”117 The clinician need not make any evaluative assessment that 
the treatment’s effect is too unlikely, too small, or not worthwhile. The clinician can 
ascertain “medically ineffective” treatment based solely on objective clinical evidence. 
But while it is easy to identify, “medically ineffective” treatment is almost never the 
subject of futility disputes.118
 Therefore, the California safe harbor is practically limited to situations in which 
the surrogate requests life-sustaining treatment contrary to “generally accepted 
111. Cal. Prob. Code § 4735 (West 2013). The statute also requires that a provider declining to comply 
must: (a) promptly inform the patient and surrogate, (b) make all reasonable efforts to assist in the 
transfer of the patient, and (c) provide continuing care until a transfer can be accomplished or until it 
appears that a transfer cannot be accomplished. See id. § 4736.
112. Id. § 4740(d).
113. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 166.046. 
114. Cal. Prob. Code § 4735. 
115. Pope, No Safe Harbor, supra note 23, at 28–31.
116. Id. at 72–75; see also Pope & Waldman, supra note 52, at 175–80.
117. Cal. Prob. Code § 4735. There are only a few situations in which treatments are medically ineffective: 
brain death, anencephaly, and neonates under twenty-two weeks gestation. See Pope, No Safe Harbor, 
supra note 23, at 57.
118. Pope, No Safe Harbor, supra note 23, at 58. But see Winkfield v. Children’s Hosp. Oakland, No. C13-
5993-SBA (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 30, 2013); Winkfield v. Children’s Hosp. Oakland, No. RP13-707598 
(Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda Cnty. Dec. 30, 2013) (order continuing temporary restraining order).
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healthcare standards.” The problem is that there simply are no such standards.119 
There is significant variability in practice.120
 Moreover, most clinicians do, in fact, provide the inappropriate treatment that 
surrogates demand.121 Clinicians are thereby creating and reinforcing the very 
standard of care with which they do not want to comply. They are legally painting 
themselves into a corner. The consequence is that generally accepted health care 
standards now include the very treatment that surrogates demand and that clinicians 
deem inappropriate. In short, the boundaries of the safe harbor are unclear at best 
and non-existent at worst.122
 And a safe harbor is important. As the volume of defensive medicine illustrates, 
health care providers are risk averse.123 While they have won almost all lawsuits for 
non-consensual withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment, the risk is 
not zero. There have been some settlements and judgments.124 And religiously 
affiliated organizations, such as the Alliance Defense Fund, litigate even low- or 
no-value cases to advance policy objectives. Additionally, there are few physicians 
willing to test the law. So the absence of adverse cases may not be due as much to 
favorable rulings as to an overall paucity of cases being brought in the first place.
 Finally, providers are not just liability-averse; they are also litigation-averse. The 
process is itself punishment because even prevailing parties pay transaction costs 
such as time, emotional energy, and stress.125 Consequently, without a safe harbor, 
clinicians accede to surrogate demands. Given the combination of risk averseness and 
legal uncertainty, clinicians perceive yellow lights as red lights.
119. See Pope, Non-Beneficial Treatment, supra note 1, at 14; see also Brief for N.J. Hosp. Ass’n et al. as Amici 
Curiae, supra note 97, at 21; Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Appellant at 17, Betancourt v. Trinitas 
Hosp., 1 A.3d 823 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010). 
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http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/812767; Allan Garland et al., Physician-Attributable Differences 
in Intensive Care Unit Costs, 174 Am. J. Respiratory & Critical Care Med. 1206 (2006); Deborah 
Cook et al., Determinations in Canadian Healthcare Workers of the Decision to Withdraw Life-Sustaining 
Treatment from the Critically Ill, 273 JAMA 703 (1995).
121. See Sibbald et al., supra note 55.
122. See Thaddeus M. Pope, Physicians and Safe Harbor Legal Immunity, 21 Annals Health L. 121 (2012). 
But cf. Daniel Merenstein, Winners and Losers, 291 JAMA 15 (2004) (illustrating how the controlling 
standard of care is determined by clinician conduct and not by what is actually best for patients).
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 D. Assessing the Traffic Lights
 When I first started writing about medical futility disputes seven years ago, I 
was confident that more states would implement green lights.126 That has not 
happened. Indeed, there appears to be a trend in precisely the opposite direction, 
toward the implementation of more red lights.
 That is an unwelcome development because it mandates the continuation of life-
sustaining treatment even when it is medically and ethically inappropriate. This might 
be characterized as a “false negative” error. By eliminating clinician discretion, red 
light states eliminate the option of positively identifying the treatment as “futile.”127 
Patients continue to suffer. Clinicians continue to experience moral distress. Other 
patients are exposed to increased risks. And scarce health care resources are wasted.128
 Green light states also pose a risk of error. But instead of producing false negatives 
like red light states, green light states increase the risk of “false positives.” As a result, 
life-sustaining treatment may be wrongly identified as inappropriate or futile. For 
example, TADA lacks essential elements of procedural due process, such as appellate 
review and an independent and neutral decisionmaker.129 Consequently, it fails to 
mitigate risks of corruption, bias, carelessness, and arbitrariness. It fails to minimize 
the risk of error in ending life-sustaining treatment.130 Clinicians and ethics 
committees may inappropriately determine that the burdens of treatment outweigh 
the benefits, because they judge the patient’s quality of life to be far lower than the 
patient herself would judge it to be.
 Yellow light states offer the greatest immediate opportunity for improvement. In 
contrast to the green light states, the yellow light safe harbors include oversight and 
accountability to the standard of care. Admittedly, that accountability is ominous 
and chilling, because of uncertainty over the standard of care. But greater clarity is 
on the way. Professional medical associations are working to develop guidelines that 
should help clarify the standard of care.131
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129. In 2013, several bills proposed improvements to the fairness of TADA, for example, by expanding the 
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VI. CONCLUSION
 The life-sustaining treatment at issue in most medical futility disputes is 
physiologically effective. It can probably sustain the patient’s life for some period of 
time. Consequently, the clinician does not make a purely medical or scientific 
judgment. Instead, she makes a value-laden judgment. The clinician judges that 
administering life-sustaining treatment is not worthwhile, because the risks and 
burdens of treatment are disproportionate to the diminished or non-existent 
opportunities for benefit.
 This is a controversial decision. There exists no general understanding about 
what sort of life, what sort of existence, is worth the deployment of medical resources. 
We are fundamentally at odds on the question of who gets to decide when enough is 
enough. Because we are f lummoxed by these questions, as a society we are unable to 
come up with a “real” definition of “futile care.” We are not yet prepared to specify 
the proper ends of medicine, the acceptable criteria for rationing, or the legitimate 
restrictions on patient autonomy.132
 But while we have been unable to fruitfully address the substantive issues raised 
by medical futility disputes, we can at least address the procedural issues. We can 
address how such conflicts are settled. “When we lack consensus on principles . . . 
we may nevertheless find a process or procedures that most can accept as fair to those 
who are affected by such decision.”133
 Like TADA, many hospital policies give a central decisionmaking role to the 
institutional ethics committee. Specifically, these policies give the ethics committee 
not only a role to mediate but also a role to adjudicate futility disputes. An ethics 
committee’s decision is legally binding only in Texas. But for practical reasons such 
as costs and judicial deference, the ethics committee often may be the forum of last 
resort in other states, too.134
 The traditional hospital ethics committee is not up to this adjudicatory task. It 
lacks the necessary independence, diversity, composition, training, or resources. 
Ethics committees are overwhelmingly intramural bodies, comprised of professionals 
employed directly or indirectly by the very same institution whose decisions the 
ethics committee adjudicates. In short, ethics committees can make decisions that 
are corrupted, biased, careless, and arbitrary.135
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 Reconstituting intramural ethics committees as multi-institutional committees 
can significantly mitigate these risks.136 Multi-institutional committees are equipped 
with the collective strength of multiple institutions’ f inancial, professional, 
educational, and disciplinary resources. And they are detached from what is often 
the unduly persuasive influence of individual supporting institutions. Consequently, 
the multi-institutional ethics committee can operate as a diverse, accountable, and 
independent decisionmaking body that can ensure difficult bioethical dilemmas are 
addressed with enhanced uniformity and care.
136. See id. at 302. Alternatively, an independent quasi-judicial tribunal like the Ontario Consent and 
Capacity Board might be an equally effective yet fair mechanism for resolving intractable medical 
futility disputes. See Cuthbertson v. Rasouli, 2013 SCC 53 ¶¶ 28, 98–103 (Can.).

